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A relatively new phenomenon in learning research called highlighting occurs when
participants show a seemingly irrational preference to attribute a stronger cue-outcome
association to a later presented perfect predictor when it is paired with an imperfect
predictor than that of an earlier presented perfect predictor paired with the same
imperfect predictor (Kruschke, 1996). Current research suggests that the highlighting
effect depends on the ability to learn to shift attention away from an irrelevant cue toward
a more relevant cue in order to reduce errors in causal judgment and preserve an earlier
formed association (Kruschke, 2003). Much research has suggested that older adults have
difficulty disengaging attention from irrelevant information, which could be problematic
in the highlighting procedure (Cohn, Dustman, & Bradford, 1984; Tipper, 1991; Mutter,
Naylor, & Patterson, 2005). However, the results of the current experiment suggest that
older adults can learn attentional shifts in order to guide associative learning and reduce
errors in causal judgments. These data prove to be a problem for many models of
associative learning (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Van Hamme &
Wasserman, 1994), but support a model proposed by Kruschke (2006).
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LEARNED ATTENTION IN YOUNGER AND OLDER ADULTS
People use cues in their environment to predict every day events. When multiple
cues are present in the environment, these cues must compete for the available associative
strength of a particular outcome. Although the actual predictive value of a cue for an
outcome would be the most logical way to determine how much associative value should
be attributed to that cue, the perceived relevance of a cue plays an equally important role.
This has been demonstrated in two associative learning phenomena known as blocking
and highlighting (Kamin, 1969; Kruschke, 1996).
Kamin (1969) trained rats to learn that a particular conditioned stimulus (CS1)
was associated with an unconditioned stimulus (US) of shock. The rats were then
presented with a compound stimulus consisting of CS1 and a novel CS2 which predicted
the same shock US. The results of his experiment revealed that when the rats were
presented with both CS1 and CS2 individually after training, they showed a much
stronger conditioned response to CS1 than they did to CS2. According to Kamin (1969),
the previous learning of the CS1 ! shock association blocked the learning of an
association between CS2 and shock.
The Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) contends that this
associative learning phenomenon can be explained in terms of the surprisingness of the
US. That is, the more surprising a US is when a CS is present, the more is learned about
the association between the CS and the US. According to the Rescorla-Wagner model,
the blocking effect occurs because the previously trained association between CS1 and
shock has made the occurrence of the shock US unsurprising. When CS2 is presented in
later training with the same shock US, nothing is learned about this redundant CS!
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because it predicts nothing new. However, other evidence (e.g., Mackintosh & Turner,
1971) conflicts with Rescorla and Wagner’s (1972) explanation. Mackintosh and Turner
(1971) found that after a CS had been blocked, subsequent learning about the association
between this blocked CS and a new outcome was attenuated. Because the RescorlaWagner model does not take an organism’s prior experience with blocked CS into
account (i.e., the blocked CS is redundant and should not be attended to), the model
would have predicted normal learning, since the blocked CS would have acquired no
associative strength at all during phase two training. This led Mackintosh (1975) to
propose that the Rescorla-Wagner model be modified so that the salience of a CS is able
to change based on the organism’s prior experience with that CS.
Considerable research suggests that organisms are able to ignore a stimulus based
on prior experience (e.g., Kruschke & Blair, 2000; Mackintosh & Turner, 1975).
Moreover, there is evidence that organisms can also learn to attend to a stimulus based on
prior experience, in a phenomenon known as highlighting (Kruschke, 1996). Kruschke
(1996) presented participants with an imperfect predictor (I) and early perfect predictor
(PE) of an early outcome (E) in an early training phase. In a second phase of training, he
presented participants with the same imperfect predictor (I) and a new perfect predictor
(PL), which predicted a new outcome (L). Upon testing cue I and the compound cue
PE.PL, Kruschke’s (1996) data showed that participants had a strong preference for E
when presented with I, and a strong preference for L when presented with PE.PL. Similar
to Mackintosh’s (1975) explanation of blocking, Kruschke (2003) suggested that this
effect is a result of a learned shift of attention. He proposed that when participants were
presented with the compound cue I.PL ! L, they directed attention away from I and
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toward PL in order to preserve the previously formed association between I and E. Thus,
there is a weak relationship between I and L at test. Kruschke (2003) further contends
that this occurs because the previous association between I and E in I.PL ! L trials
interferes with responding correctly.
Although there is much evidence suggesting that older adults show deficits in
many areas of cognition, including attentional processes (Mutter & Pliske, 1994; Mutter
et al., 2007; Mutter & Plumlee, 2009), there has been no research on whether older adults
can rapidly learn to shift attention to newly relevant cues in the highlighting task in order
to reduce errors in causal judgment. There is some evidence that suggests that older
adults may have difficulty with this task. For example, Mutter, Strain, and Plumlee
(2007) found that older adults are biased in their memory of new contingency evidence
when it is consistent with their prior beliefs. They contend that this may be because older
adults see contingency evidence that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs as being
irrelevant, and therefore, pay less attention to this information. Similarly, Mutter and
Plumlee (2009) showed that older adults are not as flexible in their ability to direct
attention toward more relevant, new information in a contingency judgment task.
Research on age related differences in performing the Stroop task has also yielded
evidence suggesting that older adults may not be able to learn shifts of attention in the
highlighting paradigm. The Stroop task requires participants to name the printed color of
a color word (i.e., “blue”) as quickly as possible and consists of congruent trials (i.e.,
“blue” printed in blue) or incongruent trials (i.e., “blue” printed in red). Much research in
this area has suggested that older adults have difficulty inhibiting attention to irrelevant
lexical information in incongruent Stroop trials (Cohn, Dustman, & Bradford, 1984). All
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of this evidence (Cohn et al., 1984; Mutter et al., 2007; Mutter & Plumlee, 2009)
converges on the idea that older adults have difficulty inhibiting attention to prepotent
information, which could prove to be problematic in the highlighting task.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that older adults can learn to use
attentional strategies. Mutter, Naylor, and Patterson (2005) manipulated the list structure
in a Stroop task and found that older adults were able to learn this list structure and adjust
their attentional strategy in order to reduce error. These data imply that older adults may
indeed be able to learn the attentional shifts required in the highlighting procedure.
The current study examined the effects of normal aging on older adults’ ability to
learn to rapidly shift attention from a stimulus with a previously formed association
toward a more relevant novel stimulus in order to preserve this earlier formed association
and reduce errors in causal judgment. The results of this study suggest that older adults
are able to carry out these processes normally in the highlighting task.
Although prior research might have suggested a deficit in older adults’ ability to
learn shifts of attention, that research is not necessarily at odds with the findings
presented here. Mutter et al. (2009) found that older adults have particular difficulty with
preventative (i.e., the nonoccurrence of Event A predicts the occurrence of Event B), but
not generative associations (i.e., the occurrence of Event A predicts Event B). Given that
highlighting involves only generative associations, and that older adults are able to learn
shifts of attention in the Stroop task in order to reduce error (Mutter et al., 2005), it makes
sense then that older adults showed a robust highlighting effect. If older adults retain the
ability to shift attention in the context of generative associations, but not preventative
associations, the results presented here suggest that the failure of a mechanism other than
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attentional shifting must be responsible for older adults’ deficits in preventative causal
judgments.
Mutter et al. (2009) suggested that older adults have trouble generating a
representation of the absent information in contingency judgments with preventative
associations. Further research in age differences in the retrospective revaluation of absent
stimuli provides further support for this hypothesis (Mutter, Asriel, & Holder, 2010). In a
series of experiments, examining a learning phenomenon called unovershadowing,
Mutter et al. (2010) presented younger and older participants with A.B ! X+ (X+ denotes
the occurrence of outcome X) in early training. Participants were then trained on A ! X(X- denotes the nonoccurrence of outcome X) trials. In a subsequent test phase, younger
adults had revalued (by increasing) the association between B and X+ during A ! X-,
even though B was not presented. Older adults, on the other hand, failed to revalue the B
! X+ association. The findings of Mutter et al. (2010) in combination with the results of
the current study prove to be a problem for many models of associative learning (e.g.,
Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994).
The Rescorla-Wagner model fails to account for highlighting, predicting that
individuals will show equal preference for E and L when presented with I and PE.PL. It
is also unable to account for unovershadowing as it predicts that no learning will take
place for an absent cue. Mackintosh’s (1975) model, although able to account for the
learned attentional shifts in highlighting, is also unable to account for unovershadowing
as it, too, predicts no learning for an absent cue. A modification to the Rescorla-Wagner
model by Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994), assigning a negative value to the learning
rate parameter of an absent-but-expected cue, is able to account for unovershadowing, but
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fails to predict highlighting. Moreover, according to Van Hamme and Wasserman’s
(1994) model, if older adults are able to learn shifts of attention in highlighting, they
should also be able to shift attention to an absent cue in unovershadowing. Therefore this
model does not have the necessary mechanisms to explain why older adults show a robust
highlighting effect, while showing a deficit in retrospective revaluation. On the other
hand, Kruschke’s (2006) locally Bayesian learning model is able to account for both
unovershadowing and highlighting, and also has the necessary mechanisms to explain
older adults’ failures and successes in these learning phenomena.
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CHAPTER 1
Literature Review
On a daily basis, people must learn about and use cues in their environment to
predict events. For example, investors in the stock market learn to predict when to buy or
sell stocks based on the current sales of, new innovations in, and leadership roles in a
company in which they have invested. Likewise, one would likely learn to predict that it
would rain and prepare accordingly when one walks outside and there are dark clouds in
the sky, and the neighbors and passersby are unpacking their umbrellas and wearing
raincoats. When multiple predictive cues co-occur in the environment, one must take into
account how well each cue predicts a particular outcome and whether or not information
about one cue is dependent on another cue. This type of causal judgment phenomenon is
known as cue competition. For instance, if one eats steak and potatoes for dinner and
later developed hives, one would associate that meal as being the cause of the allergic
reaction. If, on the next day, the same person were to eat a steak and hives did not
develop, more than likely that person would develop a stronger association between the
potatoes that were eaten and the allergic reaction. Thus, the causal value of the potatoes is
dependent upon the causal value of the steak.
While it would be logical to learn about each cue equally well to make the best
predictions based on the predictive values of each cue, much research suggests that this
does not necessarily occur (Kamin, 1969; Kruschke & Blair, 2000; Kruschke 2001a;
Kruschke, 2001b; Kruschke 2001c; Mackintosh & Turner, 1971). What is typically seen,
when two or more predictive cues are simultaneously presented in the environment, is
that one is more likely to learn more about a cue that is more salient or more likely to!
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reduce errors in judgment (Kamin, 1969; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975;
Kruschke, 2003).
Blocking
Although salience and predictive validity play a very important role in cue
competition, the perceived relevance of a cue may also prove to be important in the
acquisition of associations. Kamin (1969) demonstrated this with what he called the
“blocking effect.” In his experiment, he presented rats with two training phases and a test
phase. In the first training phase, rats were trained to form an association between a
conditioned stimulus (CS1) and an unconditioned stimulus (US) of shock. In the second
phase, a second stimulus (CS2) was added to the first to form a compound cue that
predicted the same shock (i.e., CS1.CS2 ! shock). In a third, and final phase of the
experiment Kamin (1969) tested how the rats responded to each CS individually in regard
to its ability to predict shock. The results of his experiment revealed that rats showed
strong conditioned response to CS1, but a very weak conditioned response to CS2. Thus,
the data suggested that the learning of an association between CS2 and shock had been
“blocked” by the previously learned association between CS1 and shock. Kamin (1969)
suggested that this was because the second cue was redundant and did not predict
anything new. Specifically, after the first phase of training the shock was perfectly
predicted by CS1 and was therefore not surprising when CS2 was presented in compound
with CS1. Due to this lack of surprisingness of the US, no learning took place between
CS2 and shock.
Although many current models of associative learning accurately predict the
occurrence of the blocking effect, the underlying processes that occur during blocking
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have been a topic of debate between the proponents of these different models. Rescorla
and Wagner (1972) were the first to propose an explanation of the blocking effect using a
model of associative learning. The Rescorla-Wagner model is a mathematical model that
is based on the central idea of surprise that was proposed by Kamin (1969). The idea is
that the association between a CS and US is guided primarily by the surprisingness of the
occurrence of the US. That is, there is more learning about the occurrence of a US if the
US is more surprising. Using the surprisingness of the US as its basis, the RescorlaWagner model (demonstrated below in Equation 1) can calculate the change in the
associative strength between a CS and US on a given trial.

!Vxn+1 = !"(# - $V)

(1)

In this equation, V represents the predictive value of a given stimulus (or stimuli). The
!V term is the change in the associative strength that occurs on a given trial for a
stimulus. $V represents the total amount of associative strength for all of the stimuli that
are present on a given trial. The ! and " terms are learning rate parameters based on the
salience of the CS and US, respectively. The # term is the maximum associative strength
that is supported by a US, and is determined by the magnitude of the US. For instance, a
certain US may be able to support more associative strength than another US. In a
circumstance such as this, one particular US may be able support an associative value of
1, while a second US may only be able to support a fraction of that value. Therefore, a
higher US magnitude raises the asymptote of the learning curve.
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The (# - $V) quantity in the equation can be thought of as the calculation for the
surprisingness of a US, given the presentation of a CS. As the %V term increases on each
trial, the difference between # and $V decreases to the point that, eventually, no more
associative strength can be acquired between a CS and a US because the US is no longer
surprising. The ! and " learning parameters directly influence how steep the slope of the
learning curve is, such that a greater salience of either a CS or US increases the slope of
the curve. Essentially, the Rescorla-Wagner model is able to make predictions about
behavior in learning, when given the salience of a CS and US, by multiplying these
learning parameters by the difference of the # term and $V term in each trial.
According to the Rescorla-Wagner model, CS1 blocks learning to CS2 because all
of the available associative strength has already been acquired by CS1 in the first phase
of training. That is, there is no associative strength available for an association to develop
between CS2 and shock. However, should the salience (i.e., intensity) of the shock US
increase or decrease, thus constituting surprise (since a decrease or increase would be
unexpected), when CS1 and CS2 are presented in compound, CS2 would acquire either
inhibitory or excitatory associative strength depending on the direction of the change in
salience of the US. For example, an increase in shock intensity when CS1 and CS2 are
presented in compound would result in CS2 acquiring excitatory associative strength with
shock, whereas a decrease in intensity would result in the acquisition of inhibitory
associative strength, thereby resulting in the unblocking of the redundant CS.
Although Rescorla and Wagner’s (1972) model predicts the blocking effect, the
results of a study conducted by Mackintosh and Turner (1971) are not congruent with the
model’s explanation of blocking. Mackintosh and Turner (1971) trained two groups of
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rats to predict a shock US in the presence of a noise stimulus in the first phase of their
experiment. After this initial phase, the experimental group of rats received an additional
training phase in which a light stimulus was paired with the noise stimulus, which
predicted the same shock (i.e., the typical second phase of a blocking procedure). The
second (control) group of rats received no additional training during this phase. In the
final phase of training, both groups were presented with the compound light and noise
stimulus prior to receiving a more intense shock. Given the design of Mackintosh and
Turner’s (1971) experiment, the Rescorla-Wagner model would have predicted that both
groups of rats should have developed the association between the light stimulus and the
more intense shock. For the rats that received the second blocking phase, there should be
no learning at all about the light stimulus in the second phase, but, because the intensity
of the shock was increased in the third training phase (increasing surprise), an association
should have been formed between the light and the high intensity shock. However, the
results of Mackintosh and Turner’s (1971) study demonstrated otherwise. Their data
showed that rats that received the two phases of blocking training (i.e., the additional
second phase of training) exhibited less responding to the light cue after the third phase
of training than the group that did not receive any training in the second phase. Thus,
learning to the light stimulus had been attenuated in the group that received training in
phase two. Mackintosh and Turner (1971) suggested that this was because the rats in the
experimental group recognized that the additional CS in the second phase did not predict
anything new, and that this experience led them to ignore the redundant CS, both in
Phase 2 training and in subsequent training. Thus, little was learned about the association
between the redundant CS and the higher intensity shock in the third training phase.
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Although the Rescorla-Wagner model was able to accurately predict the
occurrence of the blocking effect, it was not able to account for the attenuation of
learning to a redundant CS seen after blocking (e.g., Mackintosh & Turner, 1971).
Rescorla and Wagner (1972) would have contended that CS2 should have normally
developed an association to the novel outcome after having been blocked previously
because the second CS did not acquire either inhibitory or excitatory associative strength
during training and because its salience should have remained constant. However, the
evidence from Mackintosh and Turner’s (1971) study suggests that there may be more to
the blocking effect than simply how surprising the US is, as suggested by Rescorla and
Wagner (1972). This attenuation of learning seen after a cue has been blocked has led
researchers (e.g., Mackintosh & Turner, 1971; Mackintosh, 1975; Kruschke & Blair,
2000) to suggest that something is learned about the blocked cue: inattention. If subjects
learn to ignore the blocked cue, this could be a better explanation of the blocking effect
and the subsequent attenuated learning. According to this view, when a redundant CS is
presented in the second phase of training, subjects learn to ignore it because it does not
provide new information. In subsequent learning trials in which the blocked cue is
presented, learning is retarded because subjects have learned not to attend to that cue
based on prior experience.
Although most early research on the blocking effect was conducted in animals,
there is also much evidence that it occurs in human causal learning (e.g., Arcediano,
Matute, & Miller, 1997). In one study, Arcediano et al. (1997) presented two groups of
young participants with cue A in the first phase of training. The experimental group
received normal blocking training where cue A perfectly predicted a US, while the
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control group received training where cue A was uncorrelated with the occurrence of a
US. In the second phase of training, both groups of participants were presented with the
compound cue A.X (compound cues are denoted with a period between them), which
perfectly predicted the occurrence of a US. In a subsequent test phase, participants in the
experimental group showed less responding to cue X in the test phase than did the control
group. Thus Arcediano et al. (1997) were able to demonstrate the blocking effect in
human causal learning.
Kruschke and Blair (2000) conducted a series of experiments to test the cause of
the attenuated learning to a previously blocked cue in a standard blocking procedure. The
first experiment used a disease diagnosis paradigm arranged to test whether the
retardation of acquisition occurred to a blocked cue in human causal learning. The
paradigm consisted of symptoms (CS), which predicted a disease (US). +,!-./!0123-!4.53/!
60!-./!/74/218/,-9!452-1:145,-3!;/2/!<1=/,!>!!!)!-251,1,<!06??6;/@!AB!>CD!!!)!
-251,1,<!1,!-./!3/:6,@!4.53/C!EF21,<!-./3/!0123-!-;6!4.53/3!452-1:145,-3!;/2/!5?36!
42/3/,-/@!;1-.!E!!!#!-251,1,<!-215?3!1,!62@/2!-6!?5-/2!533/33!5--/,F5-/@!?/52,1,<!-6!
-./!A?6:G/@!:F/!H1C/C9!:F/!DIC!>!,6=/?!:6846F,@!:F/!5336:15-16,9!JC+!!!&9!;53!
42/3/,-/@!1,!-./!3/:6,@!4.53/!-6!1,!62@/2!-6!533/33!A?6:G1,<!60!:F/!DC!+,!-./!-.12@!
4.53/!60!-./!/74/218/,-9!452-1:145,-3!;/2/!42/3/,-/@!;1-.!:F/!DC+!5,@!42/0/22/@!
6F-:68/!&!-6!6F-:68/!)9!-.F3!/7.1A1-1,<!-./!A?6:G1,<!/00/:-C!K52-1:145,-3!;/2/!-./,!
42/3/,-/@!;1-.!>CDCL!!!"!5,@!ECMCN!!!$!-251,1,<!-215?3!1,!-./!06F2-.!4.53/!60!-./!
/74/218/,-C!+0!?/52,1,<!5A6F-!-./!A?6:G/@!:F/!HDI!;53!5--/,F5-/@9!-./,!;./,!
452-1:145,-3!;/2/!42/3/,-/@!;1-.!DCM!1,!-./!01,5?!4.53/!60!-./!/74/218/,-!-./B!
3.6F?@!42/0/2!6F-:68/!$!6=/2!6F-:68/!"!A/:5F3/!:F/!M!.5@!,6-!A//,!A?6:G/@!5,@!
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3.6F?@!<52,/2!862/!5--/,-16,!-.5,!:F/!DC!Indeed the results of the test of cue B.E
yielded high responding to outcome 4 suggesting that learning had been attenuated to the
blocked cue. In addition to these findings, the results of a second experiment suggested
that the attenuated learning shown in their first experiment was not merely due to the
novelty of the latter cues, and further implicated learned inattention to the blocked cue.!
The results of Kruschke and Blair (2000) further reveal inconsistencies with the
predictions of the Rescorla-Wagner model as it pertains to blocking. Their data suggest
that there is indeed learned inattention to a blocked cue, whereas Rescorla and Wagner
(1972) would have predicted no learning at all to the blocked cue. However, Kruschke
and Blair’s (2000) data are congruent with a model of learning proposed by Mackintosh
(1975). Unlike the Rescorla-Wagner model, Mackintosh (1975) suggested that the
learning parameter for the CS used in models of associative learning should be able to
change based on previous experience. This modification allows attention to play a role in
this type of conditioning, and thus it is able to account for the attenuation of learning to
the blocked CS, since it allows subjects to learn to shift attention away from it.
In his theory of selective attention, Mackintosh (1975) suggests that it is not
enough that models of associative learning simply allow for the physical salience of a CS
(i.e., the ! parameter in the Rescorla-Wagner model) to impact the degree to which
associative strength is acquired between that CS and a US. He contends that it also must
take into account prior experience with a CS. For instance, if a previous experience with
a CS is correlated with a change in the US, then the salience of that CS will increase. On
the other hand, if that prior experience is uncorrelated with a change in the US the
salience of the CS will decrease. Although Mackintosh (1975) acknowledges that these
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changes can occur inversely (i.e., if ! for one CS increases, then the ! for another CS
that is present may decrease), his theory proposes that these changes may also occur
independently. For example, if ! for a CS is high, his theory does not necessarily imply
that if the ! parameter for a second CS decreases, that ! for the first CS will increase as a
result. Moreover, because Mackintosh (1975) allows ! to change with experience, he
allows learned attention to modulate the acquisition of associative strength between a CS
and US. For instance, in his explanation of blocking, Mackintosh (1975) suggests that
because the presentation of the second CS is not correlated with a change in the US, its !
parameter decreases. At this point in the experiment, subjects have learned that the
second CS does not predict anything surprising. Therefore, their prior experience with the
redundant CS tells them that when that stimulus is present it will not predict anything
new. Thus it receives less attention in phase three training and does not readily develop
an association with the new US.
Kruschke, Kappenman, and Hetrick (2005) provided further support for the
learned attention model proposed by Mackintosh in an eye-tracking study. Their
experiment used the same blocking procedure as Kamin (1969), and eye gaze duration
was monitored during both training phases and the test phase. The results of the study
showed a strong correlation between the amount of time a participant gazed a stimulus
and that participant’s preference for the outcome associated with it. For instance, when
participants viewed a compound CS (i.e., A.B ! X) in the second phase of training, and
they spent more time attending to the earlier presented cue A, at test they were more
likely to prefer the outcome associated with cue A and less likely to have a preference for
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cue B, added in the second phase. These, results further implicate attention as a key
mechanism of blocking.
Learned attention: the highlighting effect
The evidence suggesting that one can learn to shift attention away from a
redundant, novel cue in a compound has led to recent research examining whether or not
one can learn to shift attention toward a more predictive, newly added cue (e.g.,
Kruschke, 1996; Kruschke, 2001a; Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 2005). Kruschke
(1996) provides evidence suggesting that organisms can indeed learn to attend to a cue in
a learning phenomenon called highlighting – an adaptation of the inverse base rate effect
demonstrated by Medin and Edelson (1988). In Kruschke’s (1996) experiment,
participants received two phases of training and a test phase, similar to a blocking
procedure. In the first phase of training, participants learned that a compound CS
consisting of an imperfect predictor (I) and an early perfect predictor (PE) yielded a
certain early outcome (denoted as I.PE ! E). In the second phase of the training,
participants were presented with the same imperfect predictor paired with a new (late)
perfect predictor (PL) of a new outcome (i.e., I.PL ! L). Cue I was considered to be
imperfect because over the course of the experiment it was presented equally often with
each outcome, and was not any more predictive of one outcome or the other. In the test
phase of the experiment participants were presented with PE.PL and I to assess the
associative strength of each cue. One might expect that participants would learn that I is
an imperfect predictor of either outcome, that PE and PL are both perfect predictors of
their respective outcomes, and that responding to both I and PE.PL would be equal for all
outcomes. For instance, if PE and PL were recognized as being perfect predictors of
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outcomes E and L, respectively, then they should acquire an equal amount of associative
strength with those outcomes. When they are paired together (PE.PL) at test, they should
elicit equal preference for E and L. On the other hand, if cue I was recognized as an
imperfect predictor, it would have developed no associative strength with either outcome,
and at test should also yield equal preference for E and L. However, the results of
Kruschke’s (1996) experiment revealed that participants had strong preference for the L
outcome when presented with PE.PL and a strong preference for the E outcome when
presented with I. Although there might be concern as to an effect of the frequency of the
cue-outcome associations being presented (i.e., the base rate), a recent experiment
conducted by Kruschke (2009) further suggests that this effect occurs regardless of
stimulus base rate. In this study, the same highlighting paradigm was used, but the base
rate of the cue-outcome associations were equalized across the entire experiment. These
results suggest that, even with equal cue-outcome frequency, the highlighting effect is
still present and robust.
The highlighting effect has proven to be a challenge for many models of
associative learning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). The Rescorla-Wagner model is
unable to explain why participants show stronger preference for L when PE.PL is
presented and a stronger preference for E when I is presented. Indeed, Rescorla and
Wagner (1972) would predict that learning would occur in a completely rational fashion,
such that participants would learn that I is an imperfect predictor and that PE and PL are
perfect predictors. Thus PE and PL would have equally high associative strength with
their respective outcomes, while cue I would have little to no associative strength with
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either outcome. Therefore, participants should show no outcome preference when
presented with PE.PL or I upon test.
Kruschke (2003) suggests that the fundamental underlying process of the
highlighting effect is the need for attention to be rapidly shifted away from the redundant
stimulus, cue I, early on during later training (i.e., I.PL ! L) to preserve the association
between I and E. Moreover, he suggests that these shifts in attention are learned so that
when a participant is presented with an I.PL ! L association in later trials, the participant
is more readily able to avoid errors and make more accurate predictions. According to
Kruschke’s (2003) hypothesis, if the shift was not rapid, then the association between I
and E would deteriorate as cue I developed an association with L and, thus, cues PE and
PL would have approximately equal associative strength to their respective outcomes.
Thus, without this shift of attention, the associative values of the cues would be similar to
that predicted by the Rescorla-Wagner model. Cue I would develop very weak
associations with both E and L in later trials since it would not be a strong predictor of
either outcome (i.e., cue I would eventually have an approximate associative strength of 0
between both E and L). On the other hand, this weakened association between cue I and
outcomes E and L would allow cues PE and PL to develop associations of approximately
1 between E and L, respectively. However, to test this hypothesis one would need to
examine whether or not attenuation of learning occurs for cue I in relation to cue PL.
The shifts in attention seen in both blocking and highlighting may seem irrational
on the surface, but according to Kruschke (2003) these attentional shifts can be rationally
explained in terms of error reduction. In a highlighting paradigm, if one is presented with
I.PE ! E and is subsequently presented with I.PL ! L, then the previously formed
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association of I with E should cause interference with the learning of I.PL ! L, thus
increasing the potential for error. However, if one shifts attention away from cue I in
favor of cue PL in the later I.PL ! L trials, error is reduced by learning to ignore cue I
and directing attention toward cue PL in this configuration. Similarly, in a blocking
procedure, after the initial association between the initially presented CS1 and a US is
made, and one is presented with the compound cue-outcome association CS1.CS2 ! US,
shifting attention in favor of CS2 would cause weaker responding to the US since there is
no existing association between CS2 and the US. Thus, learning to shift attention away
from CS2 to CS1 helps to preserve the association between CS1 and the US, thereby
reducing error.
This explanation of the rationale for the occurrence of the blocking and
highlighting effects is consistent with the connectionist model of learning proposed by
Kruschke (2001c). Based on the attentional model of learning proposed by Mackintosh
(1975), Kruschke’s (2001c) model, known as EXIT, is centered upon the ability of an
organism to learn attention based on experience. This model suggests that each
dimension of a stimulus has a learned attentional strength that is governed by its
relevance in relation to an outcome. In short, dimensions that are more relevant to
predicting an outcome will acquire more attentional strength than dimensions that are not.
Kruschke (2003) suggests that when a cue is presented it activates dimensional nodes at
the lowest layer of the nodal network. This activation then travels to an attentional gate
where the strengths of attention to these dimensions are made available to modulate
learning. Subsequently, associations between cue dimensions and outcome nodes are then
made depending on how much attentional strength each dimension has acquired, such
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that dimensions with greater attentional strength propagate a stronger association to the
outcome node. It is at this point that a choice is made in responding. After the choice has
been made, the organism will receive feedback, which will then guide the distribution of
attentional strength appropriately in order to reduce future error.
According to the EXIT model, the correct response to a cue can be represented by
an optimal activation of the outcome nodes, which is then modulated by attention. If
responding to an outcome results in error, then attention will shift rapidly to compensate.
Thus, more attention will be shifted to cues that reduce error. When the desired
distribution of attention to cues or cue dimensions is met, the remaining error is reduced
by the assignment (or reassignment) of associative weights to the outcomes. Therefore,
this rationale of minimizing error in learning can apply to both learned attention and
associative learning.
Kruschke et al. (2005) provide further evidence supporting this explanation of
highlighting. Comparable to their eye-gaze experiment on blocking, Kruschke et al.
(2005) found that when participants viewed PE.PL upon test, the duration of their visual
attention was longer for cue PL than for PE. Similarly, when participants viewed I.PL,
visual attention was shifted away from cue I and towards PL for a longer duration. These
data further implicate learned attention as being at least one of the underlying
mechanisms of the highlighting effect.
Aging and Attention
Although there is a great deal of evidence showing age related deficits in general
causal learning (Mutter & Pliske, 1994; Mutter et al. 2007; Mutter & Plumlee, 2009),
there has been very little research on aging and the attentional processes involved in the
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highlighting effect. However, there is evidence from other studies that suggests that older
adults may not show this effect. For example, recent research suggests that older adults
ignore information that conflicts with a previous belief in a contingency judgment task.
Mutter and Pliske (1994) found that older adults have better memory for contingency
evidence that confirms a prior belief than evidence that disconfirms that belief. Similarly,
Mutter et al. (2007) found that when older adults held a prior belief about the relationship
between two events they were less likely to improve in a contingency discrimination
when new information was presented that was contrary to their prior beliefs. Their data
also suggested that older adults are biased in their memory toward contingency evidence
that is consistent with their prior beliefs. In light of these findings, Mutter et al. (2007)
proposed that this effect might occur because older adults perceive new evidence that is
inconsistent with their prior beliefs to be irrelevant and therefore ignore that information.
In addition to the implications regarding the ability of older adults to adequately
use attentional strategies in contingency judgments, there has been much research
involving the effects of aging on attention to relevant cue dimensions in the Stroop task.
In a typical Stroop design, participants are presented with a color word (i.e., “blue”) in
either a congruent or incongruent color print. Participants are then required to name the
color print of the word being presented as promptly as they can, since reaction time is
typically measured. For example, in an incongruent trial, the experimenter might present
the word “blue” printed in the color red. In this case, the participant would have to
identify “red” as the color that the word is presented in. On the other hand, in a congruent
trial, the participant might be presented with the word “blue” printed in blue and he or
she would respond accordingly. The key underlying process taking place in the Stroop
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task is the direction of a participant’s attention to the most relevant dimension of the cue
(i.e., the word, or the print color), given the goals of the task. As might be expected, in a
typical Stroop task participants are usually faster and/or more accurate in a congruent
trial than in an incongruent trial, since an incongruent trial requires a shift of attention
from the word dimension to the color dimension to avoid responding to the conflicting
information.
The literature on aging and the Stroop task has shown that older adults tend to
perform much more poorly during incongruent Stroop trials than during congruent trails
(Cohn et al., 1984; Mutter et al., 2005). This suggests that older adults have difficulty
disengaging their attention from the irrelevant lexical cue dimension during incongruent
trials. These findings, in combination with those found by Mutter et al. (2007), may
suggest that older adults have more difficulty than younger adults inhibiting their
attention to irrelevant prepotent information (i.e., lexical information, prior beliefs, etc.),
since they may perceive less dominant information as being more relevant.
Additionally, a recent study examining age differences in contingency judgment
(Mutter & Plumlee, 2009) found that older adults might not be as flexible in directing
attention toward new evidence. Mutter and Plumlee (2009) examined the integration of
contingency evidence in judgments of learning in younger and older adults. Younger and
older participants were presented with contingency evidence that was either abstract or
meaningful to examine whether or not there were age differences in the processing and
integration of these types of information in their causal evaluation. For instance,
meaningful contingency evidence might have been that when a certain fertilizer is used a
particular plant would bloom, whereas abstract evidence would have been whether or not
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an “Event A” occurred and whether or not a different “Event B” occurred. Their data
showed no age differences in causal judgments based on abstract contingency
information. On the other hand, while younger adults showed greater accuracy when
presented with meaningful contingency information, older adults were less accurate in
their predictions of preventative associations than younger adults. These findings suggest
that older adults may not be as flexible as younger adults in their ability to direct attention
toward evidence that may be more relevant.
On the other hand, there is some evidence (e.g., Mutter et al., 2005) that suggests
that older adults can learn to adjust their attentional strategies based on the context of the
Stroop task. In an experiment conducted by Mutter et al. (2005) younger and older adults
were given one of two possible lists in the Stroop task. One list had 80% congruent trials
and 20% incongruent trials, while the other had 80% incongruent trials and 20%
congruent trials. Although older adults still showed a decline in performance during the
incongruent trials as compared to younger adults, their performance in Stroop task
increased as a result of the manipulated list structure. The results of this study suggest
that when older adults were able to identify the list structure in the Stroop task they were
able adjust their attentional strategy in order to reduce error and increase overall
performance.
Current Study
There is much evidence to suggest that cognitive functioning, including
attentional control, declines with age (e.g., Mutter et al., 2007; Mutter & Plumlee, 2009).
Additionally, studies have shown that there is a marked decline in the ability of older
adults to inhibit attention to irrelevant information (Cohn et al., 1984; Tipper, 1991;
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Mutter et al., 2005). The purpose of the current study is to examine whether or not older
adults can learn to direct attention toward a novel CS in order to preserve an earlier
association, thereby exhibiting the highlighting effect. To our knowledge, no previous
research has been conducted on the effects of aging on learned attention in a highlighting
or related paradigm. However, there has been much research conducted regarding older
adults’ performance in tasks that may be related to their ability to shift attention (Mutter
et al. 2005; Mutter et al. 2007; Mutter & Plumlee, 2009).
Mutter et al. (2005) and Mutter et al. (2007) found evidence that older adults have
difficulty disengaging their attention from irrelevant lexical information in the Stroop
task and from previously formed beliefs in contingency judgment. These findings suggest
that older adults have greater difficulty than younger adults inhibiting attention to
prepotent irrelevant information, which could be problematic in the highlighting task.
Additionally, the results from Mutter and Plumlee (2009) suggest that older adults do not
have the capacity to direct attention toward novel evidence of a causal relationship that is
inconsistent with their prior beliefs. If older adults lack the attentional flexibility to
inhibit their attention to irrelevant information (i.e., lexical information, prior belief, etc.),
they may have difficulty learning to shift their attention toward more relevant information
that conflicts with a previously learned association. This, in turn, might limit their ability
to attend to the later presented cue in the highlighting task. If this is indeed the case, then
older adults may exhibit a blocking effect, but should not show highlighting. For
instance, consider the blocking effect in terms of contingency evidence. In the first phase
of a blocking procedure older adults would learn a CS1 ! US association that could be
thought of as being analogous to the development of a prior belief (or prepotent
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information). When they are subsequently presented with CS1.CS2 ! US, they can make
their causal predictions based on that prior belief and easily ignore the redundant (or
irrelevant) information (i.e., CS2). However, this type of inflexibility in attention shifting
behavior could prove to be problematic for older adults in the highlighting task. The
presentation of I.PE ! E in the first phase of the highlighting procedure is somewhat
analogous to the establishment of a prior belief, while the later presented cue-outcome
association, I.PL ! L, is analogous to the addition of new, more relevant information.
Since this new information would be inconsistent with the prior belief about cue I, and
since older adults may be unable to adequately shift attention toward that information,
they may be more likely to ignore this new information instead of learning to ignore their
prior belief in favor of the new information. If, in the highlighting task, older adults view
cue PL as being irrelevant and ignore it, instead of paying more attention to it, PL would
develop a weaker association with the L outcome, and older adults would show less
preference for L when presented with PE.PL at test.
However, other evidence conflicts with this prediction. The results from Mutter et
al. (2005) suggest that older adults were able to extrapolate information about the
structure of a list in the Stroop task and learn to adjust their attention toward cue
dimensions that were more relevant for the particular list in order to reduce errors and
increase their performance. This finding suggests that, if older adults are able to
recognize cue PL as being more relevant than cue I in the later training phases of the
highlighting task, they might be able to learn how to appropriately shift their attention
toward cue PL in order to reduce errors in causal judgment by preserving the association

!

"&!
between I and E. If this is the case then older adults should show the same response
preference as younger adults during the test phase.
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CHAPTER 2
Method
Participants
Twenty-four younger adults (ages 18-29) and 24 older adults (ages ! 60) were
recruited to participate in the current study. Younger adults were recruited using the
Western Kentucky University Department of Psychology Study Board system, and were
rewarded with partial or extra class credit for their time. Older adults were recruited to
participate via mailings throughout the community and were paid a small stipend for their
time. The contact information for potential older participants was obtained from the voter
registration database and from the directory of retired faculty of Western Kentucky
University. Prior to participation in the study all participants were screened for the use of
medications that could have an impact on cognitive ability. Additionally, older adults
were screened for dementia via the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE). All older
adults who participated in the study met the passing criterion on the MMSE and no
participants were excluded based on medication use. Demographic information and other
cognitive tests that were possibly related to the experimental results of the study were
also collected for all participants.
Since age and ethnicity were of no consequence to the design of this study,
participants of both genders and of diverse ethnicities were included. Our sample of
participants from the community and the university were approximately representative of
those populations.
!
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Design and Stimuli
The stimuli used in the present study were 22 five-letter nouns chosen from the
MRC Psycholinguistic Database (http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au
/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm) with concreteness, imagability, and familiarity ratings of at
least 500. The words chosen from the pool had no apparent semantic relationship with
any of the other words and all began with a different initial letter. The words used were:
apple, brain, cigar, daisy, elbow, frost, glass, house, ivory, judge, knife, linen, movie,
nurse, ocean, phone, queen, radio, skate, tiger, uncle, world.
All stimuli were presented to participants on an Apple iMac computer with a 22inch screen. Participants’ responses were made on a standard computer keyboard using
either the F, G, H, or J keys. Stimulus pairs were positioned vertically on the computer
screen (i.e., one word on top of the other) and the four possible responses (i.e., F, G, H,
and J) were displayed in boxes, horizontally, on the bottom of the screen. Stimuli from
the pool were randomly assigned to one of three cue types: an imperfect predictor (I),
early perfect predictor (PE), or late perfect predictor (PL) in 12 separate orders. Two
participants were run on each order.
The experimental design for the current study was canonical in nature, meaning
that stimuli occurred with equal frequency throughout the procedure, as suggested by
Kruschke (2009). The design incorporated the use of three training phases and one test
phase (see Table 1). Each phase of the experiment contained a specified number of
blocks (where each block consisted of two trials of each stimulus combination) organized
to produce an equal frequency of presentation of the different cue types and outcomes
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(i.e., early or late). Two sets of predictive cues and outcomes were used (i.e.,
I1.PE1!E1, I2.PE2!E2, etc.) for each training block.
The first phase of training was designed to ensure that participants received
exposure to the early perfect predictors before being trained with the late perfect
predictors. In this phase, participants were presented with 12 blocks of both I1.PE1 ! E1
and I2.PE2 ! E2 items. In the second phase of training, participants were introduced to
the late perfect predictors (i.e., I.PL!L). During this phase the early stimuli were
presented for a total of 36 blocks and the late stimuli were presented for 12 blocks. This
ratio helped to solidify the previous associations made with the early stimuli, while
providing an adequate amount of training for participants to begin forming the later
associations. The third phase of training was the longest, containing 36 trial blocks with
early stimuli and 108 blocks with the later items. Feedback accompanied all responses
during all three phases of training.
The test phase of the experiment contained two blocks of trials in which I.PE !
E and I.PL ! L items were presented with no feedback to ensure that each participant
had accurately learned the associations. These blocks were intermixed with 1 block of
presentations of each imperfect predictor alone and a pairing of both perfect predictors
(also with no feedback) as a test for outcome preference. A total of 246 trials were used
throughout the experiment.
Procedure
All participants in the study were tested individually in the Cognition Laboratory
during a single session that lasted about three hours. When the participants arrived, they
were asked to carefully read and complete an informed consent form, and a biographical
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and health questionnaire, which included questions concerning education, marital status,
employment, socioeconomic status, and current health and wellness.
Participants were then seated at a comfortable viewing distance from the
computer screen. They were told that their task was to learn which key to press when a
certain word or pair of words was displayed on the computer screen, and that when these
words were presented they should respond by pressing either the F, G, H, or J key on the
computer keyboard. They were then shown where those keys were located on the
keyboard. Participants were also informed that feedback would be given on each of the
trials during training, but not during the test phase of the procedure.
On each trial, participants viewed stimuli as previously described, and made their
response by pressing a corresponding key on the keyboard. They had as much time as
they liked to view the stimuli and make their response. When participants made their
response in the training phases, it was be followed by immediate feedback. If the
response was correct, the phrase “Yes! The correct answer is [letter]” appeared on the
screen between the cue stimuli and the response choices on the bottom of the screen. If
they responded incorrectly, the phrase “Wrong! The correct answer is [letter]” was
displayed. Responses in the test phase were followed by the phrase “Your response has
been recorded.”
Participants were asked to complete a series of other cognitive tasks, their
performance on which might be related to their performance on the highlighting task. The
test types, measures of cognitive ability, dependent variables, and order of the protocol
are displayed in Table 2. A short break was provided to all participants between the Digit
Symbol Incidental Learning task and Reading Span task. All participants were debriefed

!

#)!
after completing both the experimental and subsequent cognitive tasks. All recruitment,
tests, methodological procedures, and informed consent forms, were approved by the
WKU Human Subjects Review Board (see Appendix 1). Informed consent forms for
younger and older adults are listed in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.
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Table 1
Highlighting design
Experiment Phase

# of Blocks

Items Presented

Frequency

Phase One

12

I1.PE1 ! E1
I2.PE2 ! E2

x2
x2

Phase Two

6

I1.PE1 ! E1
I2.PE2 ! E2
I1.PL1 ! L1
I2.PL2 ! L2

x3
x3
x1
x1

Phase Three

18

I1.PE1 ! E1
I2.PE2 ! E2
I1.PL1 ! L1
I2.PL2 ! L2

x1
x1
x3
x3

Test Phase

2

I1.PE1 ! ?
I2.PE2 ! ?
I1.PL1 ! ?
I2.PL2 ! ?
I1 ! ?
I2 ! ?
PE1.PL1 ! ?
PE2.PL2 ! ?

x2
x2
x2
x2
x1
x1
x1
x1
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Table 2
Assessments of related cognitive abilities in younger and older adults
Assessment
Measure of Cognitive Ability
Measures
Pattern Comparison
Processing Speed
Total score of
correct responses
Paired Associate Learning

Proactive Interference

Total score of
correct associations

Wisconsin Card
Sorting Task

Working Memory and
Executive Functioning

Total number of
correct responses,
errors, perseverative
responses,
perseverative
errors,
nonperseverative
errors, conceptual
level responses

WAIS Digit Symbol

Processing Speed

Total score of
correct responses

WAIS Digit Symbol
Incidental Learning

Learning and Memory

Total score of
correct responses

Reading Span

Working Memory and
Executive Functioning

Total score of
correct responses

Controlled Oral
Word Association

Working Memory and
Executive Functioning

# of words and
strategies

Mill Hill Vocabulary

Crystallized Verbal
Knowledge

Total score of
correct responses

Conditional Associative
Learning

Learning and Memory

Total score of
successful
responses,
retained responses,
forgotten responses,
discrimination failures,
perseverations,
and unsuccessful
guesses
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CHAPTER 3
Results
All of the analyses were conducted using an alpha level of p ! .05 as the criterion of
significance. The hypotheses underlying this study relied on the assumption that
participants learned I.PE ! E and I.PL ! L associations (Kruschke et al., 2005).
Participants were given I.PE ! E and I.PL ! L trials intermixed with I and PE.PL test
trials. Given that participants received a total of eight trials of I.PE ! E and I.PL ! L
during the test phase, they should respond correctly on six of those trials (75% correct) to
be above chance according to the criterion set by Kruschke et al. (2005). There were four
participants (two older and two younger) who did not reach this criterion in the test phase
of the experiment. These participants were excluded from further analyses. Two of the
excluded participants (one older and one younger) were subsequently replaced with new
participants who met the learning criterion, leaving 23 participants in each group.
Overall accuracy on the test trials for I.PE ! E and I.PL ! L was high for both
groups. Mean accuracy for younger adults was 98.37% on I.PE ! E trials and 97.83% on
I.PL ! L trials. For older adults, mean accuracy was 94.57% for I.PE ! E trials and
94.02% for I.PL ! L trials. Overall mean accuracy for younger adults was 98.10% and
overall mean accuracy for older adults was 94.84%. Younger adults showed significantly
greater overall accuracy than older adults, F(1, 44) = 4.03, p = 0.05, MSE = 30.34, !2 =
0.08. However, older adults’ accuracy was still very high and met the learning criterion.
Highlighting Analyses
Each participant received a total of four I trials in the test phase of the experiment.
The choice preference for I test trials was calculated based on the procedure used in!
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Kruschke et al. (2005). The total number of E responses was counted and the total
number of L responses was subtracted from this sum. The resulting difference was then
divided by the total number of I test trials to provide a percentage choice preference for
the E outcome during I trials. This percentage is denoted Ic. Participants also had the
option of choosing outcomes that did not correspond with original cues (i.e., I1 ! L2, I1
! E2, etc.). These instances of erroneous responses accounted for 8.70% of responses for
younger adults and 10.87% of responses for older adults. These responses were not
included in calculating choice preference.
The outcome preference data for I indicated that both younger and older adults had
a reliably greater preference for the E outcome during I test trials. Younger adults showed
a mean response preference of 68.48% for E and a mean response preference for L of
23.91% during I test trials. The mean difference for younger adults, Ic = 44.57%, was
reliably greater than zero, t(22) = 4.37, p < 0.001. Older adults showed similar results
with a 66.30% preference for E and 22.83% preference for L during I test trials. The
mean difference for older adults, Ic = 43.48%, was also reliably greater than zero, t(22) =
4.59, p < 0.001. Age differences in outcome preference for I were examined using a
between subjects one-way ANOVA comparing younger and older adults’ mean
difference scores for Ic. This analysis indicated no difference in the preference of
younger and older adults for E when presented with I test trials, F(1, 45) < 1, MSE =
2220.85.
Each participant was presented with a total of four PE.PL trials in the test phase of
the study. A mean difference score indicating choice preference, denoted as PEPLc, was
calculated by adding the total number of L responses and subtracting the number of E
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responses. This difference was then divided by the total number of PE.PL test trials to
produce a percentage choice preference for PE.PL trials. Similar to the I test trials,
participants sometimes chose outcomes that did not correspond to the test items (i.e.,
PE1.PL1 ! E2, PE1.PL1 ! L2, etc.). These responses accounted for 1.09% of younger
adult responses and 2.17% of older adult responses. These data were not used in
calculating PEPLc.
The outcome preference data for the PE.PL test trials indicated that younger and
older adults alike had a reliably greater preference for the L outcome than the E outcome
during PE.PL test trials. Younger adults showed a mean response preference of 64.13%
for L and a mean response preference of 34.78% for E during PE.PL test trials. The mean
difference for younger adults, PEPLc = 29.35%, was reliably greater than zero, t(22) =
2.48, p < 0.025. Older adults showed a mean response preference of 65.22% for L and a
mean response preference of 32.61% for E during PE.PL test trials. The mean difference
for older adults, PEPLc = 32.61%, was also reliably greater than zero, t(22) = 2.526, p <
0.025. Age comparisons were conducted using a between subjects one-way ANOVA
comparing younger and older adults’ mean difference scores for PEPLc. These data
indicated no difference between the two age groups in preference for L when presented
with PE.PL test trials, F(1, 44) < 1, MSE = 3525.20.
Upon closer examination of the highlighting data, it appeared that Ic was typically
larger than PEPLc for both groups. To determine if this difference was significant and if
it varied for the two age groups a 2 (Age) x 2 (Preference type) mixed factorial ANOVA
was conducted. No significant difference was observed in choice preference for the two
cues, F(1, 44) = 1.52, MSE = 226956.52, n.s. nor did this preference vary by age, F(1, 44)
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< 1, MSE = 1583.50.
In summary, both younger and older adults showed a robust highlighting effect.
Both age groups preferred the early-learned outcome when presented with I and the laterlearned outcome when presented with PE.PL. Additionally, no age differences were
observed in the degree of these outcome preferences individually or in the degree of the
overall highlighting effect.
Individual Differences Comparisons and Correlations
Although no age differences were found in the highlighting effect, this could
simply have been an artifact of having collected a non-representative sample of high
performing older adults. To examine this possibility, analyses of age differences in the
individual difference measures (Pattern Comparison, Paired Associate Learning [PAL],
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task [WCST], WAIS Digit Symbol, WAIS Digit Symbol
Incidental Learning, Reading Span, Controlled Oral Word Association [FAS], Mill Hill
Vocabulary, Conditional Associative Learning [CAL]) given after the highlighting task
were conducted. The mean score for younger and older adults on each measure along
with the outcomes for each age comparison are displayed in Table 3. Age differences
were found for each measure except for FAS, WCST-failure to maintain set, and Mill
Hill Vocabulary. Younger adults showed overall better performance on each of the tasks
in which age differences were found. These differences are consistent with previous data
collected in our lab on these measures in other studies. Therefore, the data suggest that
our results are not merely an artifact of testing a sample of high performing older adults.
Correlational analyses were also conducted to determine whether performance on
the highlighting task was related to performance on the individual difference measures. In

!

#'!
order to conduct these analsyses, the Ic and PEPLc mean difference scores were summed
for each participant. This measure was then correlated each individual difference
measure’s dependent variable(s). These correlations are reported in Table 4. No
significant correlations were found between highlighting performance and any of the
other cognitive tasks.
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Table 3
Comparisons of age differences in individual difference measures
Measure

MYounger
89.74

SD Younger
17.83

MOlder
61.04

SD Older
12.95

t-value
6.56***

df
44

Digit Symbol
Incidental Learning

23.39

4.44

18.48

6.02

3.26**

44

Pattern Comparison

63.36

10.37

44.00

6.54

7.94***

43

4.09

1.84

2.57

1.59

3.01**

44

Controlled Oral
Word Associations

43.26

11.16

41.00

12.38

0.65

44

CAL – %Forgotten

8.07

-3.98**

25.68

-3.98**

44

CAL %Discrimination
Failure

14.78

-1.94

23.55

-1.94

-1.94

44

CAL %Perseverations

6.00

-2.20*

12.59

-2.20*

-2.20*

44

35.78

6.27

38.30

7.92

-1.178

44

4.14

1.22

3.00

1.25

3.19**

42

WCST – Trials to
Complete 1st
Category

11.64

2.33

16.41

14.52

-2.05*

42

WCST – Failure to
Maintain Set

0.36

0.66

0.59

0.66

-1.139

42

WCST –
Perseverative Errors

5.64

1.80

8.36

4.13 -2.794**

42

105.61

10.01

85.87

Digit Symbol

Reading Span

Mill Hill
WCST – Categories
Completed

Paired Associate
Learning

15.59

Note. T-values assume equal variance. *p < .05. **p < 0.01. ***p < .001.

!

5.119**
*
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Table 4
Correlations between highlighting and individual difference measures

Ic
-.10

Highlighting
PEPLc
.13

Ic + PEPLc
.04

Digit Symbol Incidental Learning

.03

-.04

-.01

Pattern Comparison

.03

.07

.07

Reading Span

.02

-.02

-.01

Conrolled Oral Word Association

.18

.20

.25

-.12

.22

.09

.05

.18

.16

-.29

.21

-.02

.02

-.01

.01

WCST – Categories Completed

-.02

-.20

-.16

WCST – Trials to 1st Category

.06

.09

.11

WCST – Failure to Maintain Set

.01

-.08

-.05

WCST – Perseverative Errors

.05

.20

.18

Paired Associate Learning

.16

-.03

.07

Individual Difference Measure
Digit Symbol

CAL - %Forgotten
CAL - %Discrimination Failure
CAL - %Perseverations
Mill Hill

Note: No correlations listed above are significant.
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CHAPTER 4
Discussion
The current study examined potential age differences in the highlighting effect in
order to determine whether older adults were able to learn rapid shifts of attention to
modulate associative learning. Younger and older adults received I.PE ! E training trials
in the first phase of the learning paradigm. In subsequent training phases, they were
presented with I.PL ! L trials. Because cue I previously developed an association with
the early-learned outcome E, the initial presentations of this cue causes errors in causal
judgments. Thus, participants must learn to rapidly shift their attention away from cue I
and toward PL in order to reduce errors and preserve the earlier formed association
between I and E. After this learned attentional shift has occurred, cue PL is said to be
attentionally highlighted. In subsequent tests of learning, participants were presented with
cue I alone and the compound cue PE.PL. Because cue PL had been attentionally
highlighted in later training (resulting in the preservation of the earlier formed I ! E
association), participants should have preferred outcome L, when presented with PE.PL
and outcome E when presented with cue I during test trials.
In the present study, younger and older adults showed a robust highlighting effect,
preferring the early-learned outcome E, when presented with I and the later-learned
outcome L, when presented PE.PL test trials. Moreover, there were no age differences in
the degree of preference for either of these outcomes. Given that age differences in
highlighting performance might have been expected based on previous evidence
suggesting that older adults have difficulty with attention shifting and inhibition of
attention to prepotent irrelevant information (Cohn et al., 1984; Mutter & Pliske, 1994;!
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Mutter et al., 2005; Mutter et al., 2007; Mutter & Plumlee, 2009), it was necessary to
investigate the possibility that a non-representative sample of high performing older
adults may have been collected. The results of additional analyses examining age-related
differences in the individual difference measures given to all participants indicated that
the older participants recruited for the current study were representative of the
population. Therefore, the absence of age differences in highlighting was not an artifact
of collecting data from a sample of high performing older adults.
Prior to this study, no research had examined older adults’ ability to use learned
shifts of attention in order to modulate associative learning. The predictions concerning
the present study were necessarily ambiguous because research in some areas indicated
that the processes involved in attentional highlighting decline with age (Cohn et al., 1984;
Mutter & Pliske, 1994; Mutter et al., 2005; Mutter et al., 2007; Mutter & Plumlee, 2009),
while other research suggested that these attentional mechanisms might be preserved
(Mutter et al., 2005). For example, evidence from the literature on aging and the Stroop
effect indicated that although older adults have greater difficulty inhibiting attention to
prepotent word information and shifting their attention toward more relevant color
information, they are able to learn about variations in list structure and use this
information to modify their attentional strategies and optimize performance (Mutter et al.,
2005). On the other hand, research on aging and contingency judgment has suggested that
older adults are both unable to inhibit attention to prepotent information that disconfirms
their prior beliefs about the relationship between two events. (e.g., Mutter & Pliske, 1994;
Mutter et al., 2007) and inflexible in directing their attention to relevant contingency
evidence (Mutter & Plumlee, 2009). In contrast to these findings, the present results
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suggest that the mechanisms necessary to adjust attentional allocation across multiple
cues in the environment, and thereby modulate the strength of the associations formed
between those cues and their respective outcomes, are preserved with age.
It may be the case, however, that older adults are able to adjust attentional
allocation only for cues that are physically present in the environment. For example,
Mutter et al. (2007) examined age differences in the ability to integrate contingency
evidence in generative (i.e., Event A causes Event B), and preventative (i.e., the absence
of Event A causes Event B) contingencies in both abstract and meaningful contexts. They
found that for the generative contingencies, older adults’ judgment performance was
similar to younger adults’ performance in both the abstract and meaningful contexts.
However, for the preventative contingencies, there were no age differences in the abstract
context, but older adults’ judgment performance was worse than young adults
performance in the meaningful context. In the abstract context, neither group attended to
or integrated the evidence for the preventative contingencies, whereas in the meaningful
context, the young adults attended to and integrated this information but older adults did
not. Older adults may be able to shift attention for the purpose of optimizing performance
in generative contingencies when the most predictive events are cues that are physically
present but not in preventative contingencies when the most predictive events are cues
that are absent.
Older adults seem to show little or no deficit in causal judgment when dealing
with generative relationships (Mutter & Plumlee, 2009; Mutter, 2009; Mutter et al.,
2005), suggesting that they are capable of learning attentional shifts in the context of
generative relationships between cues and outcomes, but perhaps not in the context of
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preventative relationships. Taken in this context, the present findings are consistent with
the results of earlier contingency judgment experiments because the canonical
highlighting paradigm is designed around generative causal learning. In this paradigm,
cue I, cue PE, and cue PL are always physically present when the outcome occurs. Older
adults learned to inhibit attention to cue I and to direct their attention to cue PL in later
trials in order to reduce errors in causal judgment. Thus the attentional processes involved
in adjusting cue salience based on prior experience for physically present cues appear to
be intact in older adults (e.g., Kruschke 2001c; Mackintosh, 1975).However, if older
adults are able to learn to shift their attention to guide the formation of associations, then
the failure of some other mechanism must be responsible for the deficit in their ability to
shift attention to the information that is important for developing preventative
associations (e.g., the absence of cause is most predictive of the outcome). Mutter and
Plumlee (2009) suggested that older adults might have difficulty generating a
representation of absent information. If this were the case, then older adults would not be
able to shift attention to such a representation, and would thus fail to properly determine
the probability of an absent cue predicting the presence of an outcome. This hypothesis
seems to be a plausible explanation, given that highlighting does not involve the
manipulation of the associative strength of absent cues.
Recent research on age differences in retrospective revaluation (specifically,
unovershadowing) provides further support for this hypothesis (Mutter et al,, 2010).
Unovershadowing occurs when learners are first trained with A.B ! X+, and
subsequently trained with A ! X-. During this latter training phase, cue A indirectly
activates the representation of the missing cue B. Because cue A predicts the
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nonoccurrence of the initially trained outcome, the absent cue B is a more accurate
predictor of the outcome and the associative value of this cue increases. Mutter et al.
(2010) found that older adults failed to revalue the associative link between B and X+,
and hypothesized that this was because older adults had difficulty indirectly activating the
representation of the absent cue. In the final experiment of the study, Mutter et al. (2010)
provided participants with a small image in the corner of the screen of the “absent cue.”
When older adults no longer had to activate the representations of the absent cues, age
differences in unovershadowing were eliminated. From the current attentional
perspective, if older adults are unable to indirectly activate the representations of absent
cues, they will not be able to allocate attention to those representations. Thus, they will
also be unable to adjust the predictive value of these cues. However, when the need to
activate the representation of an absent cue is eliminated, older adults are able to shift
attention to the “absent cue,” and revalue its associative strength.
Retrospective revaluation is comparable to preventative learning insofar as it
involves the manipulation of absent cue information. Specifically, retrospective
revaluation requires that attention be shifted toward the absent information (in the case of
unovershadowing) or away from absent information (in the case of backward blocking).
In contrast, highlighting does not require older adults to make use of absent cues. All the
predictive information is present on each trial of the highlighting paradigm. Participants
are not required to make attentional shifts toward or away from any absent cues. Instead,
they are merely required to divide attention equally between cues in earlier training and
shift attention toward a more relevant cue in later training. Because the information
needed to guide the formation of associations in highlighting is physically present, older
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adults do not have to indirectly activate absent cue representations in order to modify the
attentional and associative strength between the cues and outcomes.
The finding of age differences in retrospecive revaluation and no age differences
in highlighting suggests that many models of learning are insufficient in accounting for
these phenomena, if they are able to account for them at all. If the models are unable to
account for the phenomena, then they are most decidedly unable to explain older adults’
successes and failures in these learning paradigms. The Rescorla-Wagner model can
predict simple excitatory and inhibitory relationships in causal learning (e.g.,
overshadowing, conditioned inhibition, extinction, etc.). However, it is unable to account
for highlighting, predicting that individuals will show no outcome preference for cue I,
and will prefer outcomes E and L for cues PE and PL, respectively. It is also unable to
explain the retrospective revaluation of absent information as the model predicts that no
learning will take place for an absent cue. Similarly, although Mackintosh’s (1975) model
may be able to account for the learned attentional shifting effects such as blocking and
highlighting, it, too, fails to account for unovershadowing as it also predicts no learning
for absent information.
The shortcomings of these models in dealing with these effects led other
researchers (e.g., Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994) to posit that the salience of an
absent-but-expected cue be set to a negative value. In doing so, these models can then
account for the acquisition of associative strength between the absent-but-expected cue
and the outcome it was initially presented with in the opposite direction a cue that is
presented. However, Van Hamme and Wasserman’s (1994) model fails to predict
highlighting. In the canonical highlighting design presented here (and in Kruschke,
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2009), the presentation of I.PE ! E and I.PL ! L trials occur equally often. Therefore,
there are no absent-but-expected cues in the paradigm, and Van Hamme and
Wasserman’s (1994) model reduces to the original model developed by Rescorla and
Wagner (1972). In addition, although the Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994) model
accurately predicts the existence of retrospective revaluation effects in learning, it does
not have the necessary mechanisms in place to explain why older adults are unable
revalue the associative strength of an absent cue. According to Van Hamme and
Wasserman (1994), in the second phase of unovershadowing, the associative value of the
presented cue decreases, and the salience of the now absent, but expected cue becomes
negative instead of positive. Van Hamme and Wasserman’s (1994) model requires that
individuals code an absent-but-expected cue as being absent and allocate attention to the
now salient representation of the absent-but-expected cue in order to adjust its associative
strength.
Older adults’ ability to learn attentional shifts in highlighting, but not in
retrospective revaluation poses a problem for the model proposed by Van Hamme and
Wasserman (1994). This is because Van Hamme and Wasserman’s (1994) model has no
mechanism in place that could explain both older adults’ successes in learning to shift
attention when cue information is physically present and their deficit in shifting attention
when the cue information is absent (Mutter et al., 2010). On the other hand, Kruschke’s
(2001c, 2006) connectionist models of learning do have such a mechanism. Although
Kruscke’s (2001c) EXIT model does not accurately account for unovershadowing, a
more recent model (Kruschke, 2006) based on the idea of locally Bayesian learning has
been shown to accurately model human behavior in both unovershadowing and backward
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blocking, as well as highlighting. Bayesian learning incorporates the use of Bayesian
probability theory to explain the development and updating of associations between cues
and outcomes. With a Bayesian approach, learners update their prior belief about the
relationship between a cue and outcome by forming a posterior belief when feedback
about their prior belief is given. When individuals begin a learning experiment such as
highlighting, the probability that any of the multiple cues presented are paired with a
given outcome is the same. Therefore, an individual’s prior belief about the relationships
between these cues and outcomes assumes no knowledge of an association. After
receiving feedback on a given trial, individuals form a posterior belief and update their
prior belief about the likelihood of outcome occurrence when a given cue is presented.
Associations are developed based on the consistency of the feedback with the previously
learned belief. If the feedback is consistent with the prior belief, the association is
strengthened, whereas feedback that is inconsistent with the prior belief weakens the
association. Associations are thus formed based on the individual’s updated belief about
the cue-outcome association.
Krushcke (2006) suggests that Bayesian learning occurs between the lower nodes
of the network representing all the cues and “hidden” nodes representing attentionally
filtered duplicates of the cue nodes, and also occurs between these hidden nodes and the
nodes representing the possible outcomes at the top most layer of the network.
Kruschke’s (2006) model also suggests that Bayesian learning takes place between local
layers of the network. That is, Bayesian learning does not occur globally within the
model. Instead, learning is based upon its local information. According to this model,
retrospective revaluation occurs because learners use Bayesian updating between local
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layers of the network in order to guide learned attentional shifts and the formation of
associations. For instance, in highlighting, the model predicts that, feedback from the
presentation of I.PL ! L trials will be inconsistent with the prior belief that I ! E.
Individuals then shift attention away from this inconsistent evidence toward belief
confirming evidence (e.g., PL ! L). The model then predicts that there is a learned
mapping of this attentional shift that takes place between the cue nodes and the hidden
nodes (the attended cues), and a learned mapping from the hidden nodes (the attended
cues) to the outcome node so that the latter learned mapping represents the association
between the attentionally filtered cue and the outcome.
The model is able to account for the retrospective revaluation effects in causal
learning along with the mechanisms involving their learned attentional allocations. In
order for the lower layer of the network to become active, thus propagating any kind of
signal to the attentionally filtered duplicates or outcome nodes, the individual must
generate and maintain a representation of the cue. These representations are generated
based on what is consistent with the individual’s current belief. That is, if an individual’s
current belief is that A.B ! X+, and A ! X- is presented, then a representation of cue B
is generated, and the individual updates the belief in the hypothesis that B ! X+. The key
to the ability of Kruschke’s (2006) model to explain older adults’ deficits in dealing with
absent cues lies in the activation of the bottom layer of the nodal network. If older adults
have difficulty generating and maintaining a representation of the absent information,
then the lower layer of the network representing the absent cue will not be active and
cannot propagate a signal to the middle and upper layers of the network.
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Kruschke’s (2006) model does seem to be able to explain older adults successes
in failures in these learning paradigms. The highlighting paradigm does not require that
older adults generate a representation of absent information for the purposes of
manipulating that information. Rather, individuals allocate more attention to the later
presented perfect predictor (PL) in later training in order to preserve the earlier-formed
I.PE ! E association. Therefore, older adults only need to manipulate attentional and
associative weights of presented information. If older adults’ deficits in generating a
representation of absent information are the cause of their difficulty in revaluing absent
information, then Kruschke’s (2006) model would accurately predict their failure to show
unovershadowing, while predicting their success in highlighting.
In conclusion, the results of the present study suggest that older adults’ ability to
learn error-driven shifts of attention that modulate associative learning remains intact.
Given older adults’ success in generative causal learning and highlighting and deficits in
preventative causal learning and retrospective revaluation, future research should look
more closely at the question of whether older adults are able to learn attentional shifts
when preventative or negative associations are involved in the blocking and highlighting
paradigms. It could be the case that older adults would be unable to perform these tasks
when preventative/negative casual judgments were used in the design. Moreover, the
results presented here, in combination with recent data collected by Mutter et al. (2010),
suggest that models that only assign a negative salience value to absent cues in order to
account for retrospective revaluation effects are missing a mechanism for the activation
and maintenance of absent information (e.g., Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994). On the
other hand, Kruschke’s (2006) implementation of locally Bayesian learning in a similar
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connectionist framework as his previous models (e.g. Kruschke 2001c) seems to be able
to account both for older adults’ success in generative causal learning and highlighting
and their failure in preventative causal learning and unovershadowing.
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